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ABSTRACT
Blockchains have gained popularity due to their versatility and wide range of application.
Blockchains are a decentralized data structure guaranteeing integrity and non-repudiation of data
We use this to secure provenance meta-data. A blockchain can be seen as a distributed database,
or a public ledger of transactions or digital events that have occurred and have been shared
among participating parties. A consensus is required to verify each transaction. Blockchains are
finding use in cryptocurrencies, academics, clinical trials, healthcare and agriculture. However,
like other networks, we need to verify the robustness and availability of the blockchain
networks. In this thesis, we leverage existing Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of
Service[D/DoS] attacks as a tool to evaluate our proposed blockchain technology, Scrybe, for
robustness. First, we check its performance in presence of Transmission Control Protocol [TCP]based flooding attacks such as SYN Flooding and its variants. We also optimize TCP kernel
parameters to improve the utility of syn cookies as a measure against SYN floods. Second, we
evaluate malicious miner attempts to exclude client transactions by stalling the mining process
and verify that consensus is reached as long as there is at least one honest miner in the network.
The underlying algorithm of Scrybe is our novel Lightweight Mining [LWM] algorithm. Our
technology guarantees the properties of data integrity and non-repudiation with minimal
resource requirements. It introduces a way to mine new blocks in the blockchain, which is not a
resource hungry Proof-of-Work [PoW] as required in many present-day cryptocurrency
applications.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Blockchain technology has drawn attention from a wide range of stakeholders including
academics, healthcare, and government agencies. A blockchain is a data structure for a shared,
distributed, and fault-tolerant database that every participant in the network can access, but none
can tamper with. Blockchains are designed to tolerate possibly malicious nodes being present in
the participating network, but they rely on honest nodes to ensure that information is not vulnerable
to manipulation. The absence of centralization speeds up the entire process. Owing to the
cryptographic structure of the blockchain, it is impractical to alter it. Based on these features,
blockchains have acquired an enormous range of applications even in sensitive fields. An important
aspect for which blockchain-based networks need to be tested is their robustness and availability
[1]. D/DoS

attacks can be used as a tool to verify these attributes. D/DoS attacks are launched by

cyber-criminals using one or more computers against a single or multiple computers or networks.
These attacks disable computers, deny access to authorized users of a particular website or an
application; or use a breached computer as a launch point for other attacks. A denial of service
attack can be an attempt to flood a network, thereby, reducing a legitimate user's bandwidth,
preventing access to a service, or disrupting service to a specific system or a user. As a smarter
strategy, the attackers target the nodes that utilize the maximum share of the resources. If
successful, the data on the application can be useless and unavailable to its owners.
Our research team has proposed a Blockchain technology, Scrybe[2] with a novel, lightweight mining algorithm [LWM], for secure provenance and related applications such as clinical
trials, academic integrity and digital forensics. The blockchain algorithm employed by most
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cryptocurrencies like Ethereum and Bitcoin, and other digital services for expanding their
blockchain is resource intensive. Scrybe offers an alternative which requires fewer resources than
proof-of-work, and is more economical. Our proposed technology maintains non-repudiation and
data integrity.
The system is built on Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Client-Server. TCP is a core
protocol of the Internet protocol suite. It sits on IP layer, and its primary task is to provide a reliable
and ordered communication channel between applications on networked nodes. TCP works in the
Transport layer, which provides host-to-host communication services for applications.
In this research, we evaluate Scrybe’s performance in presence of the TCP protocol-based
D/DoS attacks to verify robustness and availability of our algorithm. A SYN Flood D/DoS attack
on Scrybe is implemented. The attack uses IP-Spoofing, Randomized IP Spoofing and the local
area network denial-of-service(LAND) techniques on the blockchain network; and the performance
is evaluated in the presence of those attacks. Impact of increasing the size of the attack packets is
also studied. We also evaluate the effect of TCP Linux kernel parameters such as the syn-ack retries
and the max-syn-backlog queue on the impact of the attack on the network. The tool used to
generate the attack traffic is hping3, and the network analyzer used is Wireshark. In addition, we
consider the possibility of malicious intent of one or more miners to stall the LWM to prevent the
addition of a new verified block to the blockchain, or to deny transactions from some clients to the
blockchain. Modifications to the algorithm are suggested to mitigate the impact of anomalous
behavior in our system.
Our work focuses on the following:
1. Evaluating the performance of the proposed system during presence of a TCP vulnerabilities
like SYN-Flooding attack and its variants, thereby verifying robustness and availability.
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2. Verify that consensus is reached even if malicious miners try to stall the mining process as long
as at least one miner is honest.
The rest of the document is as follows: In Chapter 2, we provide background information
on necessary topics relevant to this work and the related work; in Chapter 3, we describe our
experimental set-up and the work done including the results , Chapter 4 has the analysis, and
optimization of kernel parameters; and in Chapter 5, we provide a conclusion of the work and
some prospects from future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
Since Satoshi Nakamoto published his Bitcoin white paper in 2008, blockchain has become
one of the most frequently considered solutions for ensuring security of stored data and its transfer
through decentralized, peer-to-peer networks. Being a cryptographic-based distributed
ledger, trusted transactions are enabled among untrusted participants in the network using the
blockchain technology. Since the first Bitcoin blockchain was introduced in 2008[3], blockchain
systems such as Ethereum and Hyperledger Fabric, have been developed. Blockchain has seen a
surge in interest among researchers [[4],[5],[6],[7]], software developers and industry practitioners
due to the immutability it offers [[8],[9],[10]].
An important aspect of blockchain technologies is consensus. A majority of the
participating miners need to approve who produces the next block and verify/validate this block
when added to the blockchain. Bitcoin uses the proof-of-work (PoW) mechanism where miners
compete to solve a mathematical puzzle. The miner who solves the mathematical problem earliest
gets rewarded with bitcoins. This motivates participants to be honest. However, PoW consumes a
lot of energy and is slow. An alternative consensus mechanism which is widely used is proof-ofstake (PoS). In this mechanism, miners who have a financial stake in the network are allowed to
produce the next block. Instead of spending energy to validate the block, participants need to prove
that they have network tokens in their wallet. Ethereum used PoW, but is now planning a shift to
PoS as CasperPoS, despite being energy efficient and less costly than PoW can create an oligarchy.
Miners might buy a large number of coins at the beginning of the process and monopolize future
mining rounds since they have a larger stake in the network. Variants of PoS such as Proof of
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Elapsed Time(PoET), Delegated PoS, proof-of-work, proof-of-importance , proof-of-capacity also
exist [11].
Scrybe, on the other hand, is more energy efficient and economical than PoW, thus an
attractive choice to reach consensus about who would create the next block. Scrybe is described in
Section 2.1.

2.1

Scrybe : Our Proposed Blockchain Technology
The Scrybe architecture is provided in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1. The Scrybe architecture

The description of the architecture components is as follows:

A. Blocks

Blocks are one of the prime components of the system. A sequence of verified blocks forms
the blockchain. The current block includes hash of the previous block. Hash is a mathematical
one-way function - practically infeasible to invert- that maps an arbitrary -size input data to
a bit string of a constant size. This property makes the blockchain immutable. Blocks are added
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to the blockchain by miners or entities authorized to participate in the Light Weight Mining
[LWM] round. Miners receive the list of transactions from clients or users, aggregate those and
calculate the Merkle root. A Merkle root is the hash of all the hashes of all the transactions
submitted to the blockchain network. This allows miners to confirm inclusion of all the
transactions in the block by the miner who gets to produce the next block. Once the miner gets
selected to add the next block to the blockchain based on the LWM algorithm, they broadcast
the block to all other participating miners of that particular round, and the contents of the block
including the previous hash, the Merkle root and the miner’s signature are verified. This ensures
that all transactions are included and that an authorized miner produces the block with a valid
signature.

B. Transactions

Transactions are data elements stored on the blockchain. These are the backbone of
provenance. Transactions can reference previous transactions if they are not the first transaction
themselves, or they can be genesis events, i.e. the first data collected from a particular use case
of our blockchain network. Input fields are used to make references to the previous transactions,
while as for the genesis event, output fields are used. Normal transactions have both an input
and an output field, but genesis events only have an output field. Input fields refer to the hashes
of pointers of previous transactions, while output fields contain persistent URLs (PURLs)
pointing to the data, along with the SHA-3 hash of the data, ensuring its validity. Additionally,
output fields contain PURLs that point to the provenance of the data along with its SHA-3 hash.
The size of the blockchain can drastically be reduced by storing the SHA-3 hash of the
transaction instead of the transaction itself. The transaction itself will be stored on a transaction
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server, which is locally maintained, along with the data server and the metadata server which
store the relevant information.

C. Light Weight Mining

Our novel Lightweight Mining (LWM) algorithm guarantees data integrity and nonrepudiation with minimal resource requirements. It introduces a way to mine new blocks in the
blockchain, which is not a difficult Proof-of-Work (PoW) required in present-day cryptocurrency
applications[3]. Our approach to blockchain-based data provenance, paired with the LWM
algorithm, provides the framework for key classes of provenance to be managed. The algorithm
requires minimal processing power and cost. The algorithm is:
Algo 1: Lightweight Mining (LWM)

Lightweight Mining Algorithm (LWM)
Input: The number of miners N.
Algorithm: For each miner mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
• Step 1: mi generates a random number si ;
• Step 2: mi broadcasts the SHA-3 hash of the ri, denoted by H(sj);
• Step 3: Once mi has collected all N hashes {H(s1), H(s2), · · ·,
H(sN)}, mi broadcasts the random number si.
• Step 4: Once mi has collected all N random numbers {s1, s2, · · · ,
sN}, mi calculates l =∑𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑠 j mod N.
• Step 5: ml is the selected miner to create the next block from the
collected transactions. (Without loss of generality, we map mi = j,
1 ≤ j ≤ N as a simple rank ordering for the registered miners.)
LWM ensures randomization in selecting the miner for producing the next block.
One of the core ideas of LWM is sharing the hash first and then the actual secret random number.
This guards against the possibility of a malicious miner exploiting the miner-selection process in
their favor, as discussed in Chapter 5. A malicious miner can wait to receive everyone else’s random
number to decide whether or not they like the outcome of the LWM if they shared their own
number. Sharing the hash first ensures that every miner shares the hash of their random number
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with all other miners before they are able to see other miners’ choices. Since a different random
number requires a different hash than the one they previously shared, the malicious miner cannot
change the random number after sharing its hash without being detected. Thus, LWM can tolerate
collusion of up to N - 1 malicious miners. As long as there is one honest miner value among the
values used, the modulo operation is randomized.

D. Servers

The servers are locally maintained; and will hold the raw data comprising the ledgers in which
the blockchains are held. The integrity of the transaction server can be verified by comparing the
list of transactions on the blockchain to that on the transaction server. There should be no
discrepancy between the two. Similarly, there should be no discrepancy between SHA-3 hash of
the data and the SHA-3 hash stored in the transaction to verify that the data and metadata are
disreputable.

2.2

Configuring Scrybe
For implementing Scrybe, we pull the git repository of our project on the nodes. After installing

all the necessary files, we configure some nodes as miners which receive transactions from the
nodes which send those, and some nodes as clients who have files which they need to submit to the
blockchain to secure those. The steps are as follows:
a. A node, which acts as a miner, runs the Scrybe executable to initiate mining. We have opened
up a specific port -10987 where the Scrybe miners listen and mine.
b. Another node which wants to join the mining network uses the public IP address of the first
miner to join the network. Same is true for the subsequent miners -They join the network using
the public IP address of any of the existing miners, and start mining.
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c. On each of the miner nodes, the LWM runs and a miner gets selected to produce the next block.
d. A node which is supposed to act as a client first needs to join using the public IP address of any
miner.
e. The client first needs to request a blockchain update which provides it the peer list of the
participating miners.
f.

The client submits transactions to all the participating miners of the LWM round
simultaneously.

g. The result of the modulo operation determines who gets to create the new block, adding the
client transactions submitted since the last block was added. The block is then shared with all
the participating miners, who verify it and add to their own copies of blockchain.
If a new miner needs to join the network, the steps b-g are applicable. However, to the new miner,
the relevant blockchain update as mentioned in step e is the updated length of the blockchain mined
so far. This is important before the miner is able to participate in the subsequent LWM rounds
because we want the miner to be able to add the next block at the current length of the blockchain
produced so far.

2.3

Communication Protocol In Scrybe
In Scrybe, the communication protocol used is Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). We

have a specific port – 10987 for our application. TCP works with the Internet Protocol (IP). IP
defines how packets of data are exchanged between computers. The basic rules are defined by the
TCP/IP. TCP is defined in the Request for Comment (RFC) number 793 by the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF)[16].
Since we exploit TCP vulnerabilities, we elaborate on this protocol. TCP is connectionoriented, i.e. in order to be able to exchange data, a connection needs to be established. Once
established, the connection needs to be maintained until the application programs have finished
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exchanging messages. It determines splitting application data into packets which the networks can
deliver. This protocol sends packets to, and accepts packets from, the network layer and manages
flow control. It also handles the retransmission of dropped packets as well as manages the
acknowledgement of packets arrival at each end. This helps provide an error-free data transmission
[12]. TCP

format is shown in Figure 2.2. Its size is 32 bits.

Figure 2.2. TCP packet format

From Figure 2.2, TCP packets consist of following fields:
1. Source and Destination Ports: These are 16- bit each and identify the end points of a TCP
connection.
2. Sequence Number: Its size is 32 bits. This field specifies the number assigned to the first
byte of the current message. In some conditions, it can also be used to identify the initial
sequence number belonging to a future data transmission.
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3. Acknowledgement Number: It is also 32-bits. This field contains the value of the next
sequence number that the sender of the segment is expected to receive, if the corresponding
flag of this field is set. It must be understood that the sequence number corresponds to the
data stream in the same direction as the segment, while the acknowledge number refers to
the opposite direction as of the segment.
4. Data Offset: This field is also known as header length. Its size is variable, and it conveys
the information about the number of words in the TCP header whose size is 32 bits.
5. Reserved bit: It is for future use. The default value of this bit is zero.
6. Flags: The flags convey information about the status of the TCP connection. Each of the
1-bit flags are:
i.

URG: conveys important data is in the segment.

ii.

ACK: indicates the acknowledgement number used is valid.

iii.

PSH: pushes for data to be passed to the application as early as possible.

iv.

RST: used to reset the connection.

v.

SYN: used to synchronize the sequence numbers used for initiation of a
connection.

vi.

FIN: indicates that the sender of has finished sending the data and that the
connection can be terminated now.

7. Window: This field has 16 bits and conveys information about the receive window of the
sender. In other words, it conveys how much buffer is available for incoming data.
8. Checksum: The size is 16 bits and helps error recovery by conveying whether or not the
header was damaged during transit.
9. Urgent Pointer: It’s 16 bits and points to the first urgent data byte in the TCP packet.
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10. Options: This field is of variable length; and specifies TCP options such as the Maximum
Segment Size(MSS) conveying information about the largest block of data that the sender
would send to the receiver over the TCP; or the window scale factor allowing for the
window size to go up for lines with high bandwidth [13].

11. Padding: This consists of zeros whose number is determined by the size of the Options
field. Padding ensures that the header boundary is at 32 bits and data begins right after.

12. Data: This contains upper layer information. This is also variable-sized [11].

TCP has a three-way handshake to establish connection between a client and server or
between two clients. Before a client attempts to establish connection with a server, the server needs
to first bind to and listen at a port to make it available for connections, called as the passive open
[11].

Once the passive open is established, a client is able to initiate an active open. This process

involves three steps and both the ends are required to exchange the synchronization (SYN) and
acknowledgment (ACK) packets before the real data communication process starts. This is the
reason the three-way handshake is also called the syn-synack-ack handshake. The handshake is
designed in a way such that both ends help to initiate, negotiate, and separate TCP socket
connections at the same time. It allows transfer of multiple TCP socket connections in both
directions simultaneously[16]. The process is described in Figure 2.3 below:
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Fig. 2.3. TCP three-way handshake for connection setup

The steps of establishing the connection are as follows:
Step 1. The client establishes attempts to establish a connection with the server by sending a
segment with synchronization (SYN) request. The client sets the segment’s sequence number to a
random value, X.
Step 2. In response, the server sends back a segment with an acknowledgement for the
synchronization segment sent by the client in the previous step – SYN-ACK.
The acknowledgment number is set to one number ahead of the received sequence number, i.e. to
X + 1; and the sequence number that the server chooses for the packets is another random number,
Y.
Step 3. Finally, the client responds back with an acknowledgment (ACK) of the received response
from the server in Step 2. This is called the Forward Acknowledgement. The sequence number gets
set to the acknowledgment value received in step 2, i.e. X+1; and the acknowledgement number
gets set to one value greater than the received sequence number in Step 1, i.e. Y+1[11].
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When both the client and server acknowledge each other’s requests, the handshake is successful
and a dedicated connection is established between the two machines[17]. After this the actual data
gets transferred and the connection stays open until data exchange is complete.
The completion of the data exchange is indicated by exchange of FIN flags and their
corresponding acknowledgements from both the ends. The process is shown in Figure 2.3.

Fig. 2.4. TCP connection termination

It involves the following:
Step 1. The client sends the segment with FIN flag set as high indicating the completion of data
transmission.
Step 2. The server replies with an ACK confirming that it received the FIN from the client.
Step 3. When server has no further data to send to the client, it sends a FIN segment to the latter.
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Step 4. The client side sends back the ACK to the server side conveying it received the FIN from
the latter as well. Now the data exchange has completed from both the ends and the connection
terminates.

2.4

Agreement In Scrybe

To guarantee Scrybe reaches a consensus, we use Lamport’s Byzantine- fault-tolerant (BFT)
algorithm[28]. BFT can tolerate less than

1
3

* n faulty nodes (f), where n is the total number of

participating miners in each round. BFT has been employed by a large number of researchers in
their work to tolerate faulty nodes. [[18],[19],[20],[21]].

2.5

Related Work
There is an extensive body of work on the D/DoS attacks and their implications. Liang et

al.[22] implemented a DoS attack method for an IoT system using IP Spoofing and provided results
which of the SYN flood attack was the most effective against the security of the IoT technology.
The work included evaluation of CPU and memory usage change during the attack and the effect
of the size of attack packets on the impact of the DoS attack.
Kshirsagar et al.[23] implemented a LAND DoS attack using IP spoofing and conducted a
performance analysis of the LAND DoS detection comparing their proposed Intrusion Detection
System [IDS] with state-of-the-art systems. Their proposed architecture consists of network traffic
analyzer, feature identification and extraction.
Vasek et al.[24] provide an empirical insight into impact of DDoS attacks on operators of
distributed networks such as the Bitcoin, stating that services with anti-DDoS protection are three
times more likely to be attacked.
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Johns Hopkins -APL provided an elaborate discussion on DDoS Tradeoff Analysis. They
discuss how the SYN flood attacks monopolize the resources, the relations between the attacks,
mitigation techniques and the attacker performance such that ways can be found to lower the
attacker influences[25].
Congcong et al.[23] conducted a security analysis of blockchain with a case study of 51 %
attacks. They have simulated the blockchain process and deduced the rule between the blockchain
security, attacking and attacking method and attacking power. Their study found how by adjusting
the attacking power, most of the blockchain states can be found and the probability of the honest
state becoming the attacking state can be analyzed.
K. Geetha et al.[24] have conducted identification and analysis of SYN floods against an
Ad Hoc network. They implement the SYN flood using IP Spoofing and analyze how the Quality
of Service (QoS) parameters such as the packet ratio, average end-to-end delay change due the
attack.Their findings show how the legitimate users experience a lower QoS due to the attack.
Saket et al.[25] conducted a survey of DDoS attacks on the TCP/IP protocol vulnerabilities.
They discuss how the attacks could drain the computational resources of the victim within a short
span of time. They also discuss and compare different attack tools such as LOIC, MStream and
Switchblade in terms of the vulnerabilities they exploit.
Al-Hawawreh[26] has worked on syn-flood attack on a virtual cloud and its detection based
on TCP-IP header statistical features using machine learning techniques. Their findings include the
CPU utilization comparison between before the attack and during the attack scenarios.
Kshirsagar et al.[28] have discussed the CPU load utilization and minimization for TCP syn
floods. Their work includes a survey of the attack detection techniques and a proposed attack
detection method based on the CPU threshold load and misuse detection. The analysis is primarily
based on how the TCP syn floods cause a abrupt surge in the CPU load.
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CHAPTER 3
Security Attribute Verification Using DDoS Tests
Once a distributed system has been designed to maintain performability, it becomes
important to verify that the system is successful. To do this, we consider common approaches for
disabling, or degrading distributed systems. The most successful tools are generally referred to as
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks [16]. To verify our proposed blockchain network, we
therefore integrate successful DDoS methods into our verification suite. Since Scrybe uses TCP for
communication, we leverage DoS attacks as a tool to exploit the known flaws in the TCP such as
the SYN flood D/DoS attack.
In Section 3.1 we describe the experiment platform; in Section 3.2, we describe the
experiment design, Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3 describe the TCP vulnerabilities – SYN flood
with IP spoofing, SYN flood with Randomized IP spoofing and the LAND attack respectively- we
exploit to verify the system robustness.

3.1

Experiment Platform
The proposed network is evaluated for performability in presence of SYN flood with IP

spoofing for both the cases of reachable and unreachable spoofed node, SYN flood with
randomized IP Spoofing and LAND attack. We evaluate the response time of the network when a
new miner attempts to join the existing network by sending a blockchain request. This is the most
strenuous time for the network because the entire length of blockchain mined so far is sent to the
requesting miner in this step. If the network handles this well, we assume it is robust in presence
of DoS attacks. In addition to this, we try to optimize the kernel parameters to improve the utility
of syn cookies against the SYN flood attacks.
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The components of the network are:
1. Miners: There are N participating miners. Miners receive transactions from Clients. The miner
selected using the algorithm in Section 2.1 produces the new block, broadcasts it to all the
miners. Then each miner appends it to the last block of the blockchain locally.
2. Client: Clients submit transactions to the miners to secure their data, and make it immutable.
For our experiment, we configure a single client that submits transactions to all miners. This is
sufficient for these test scenarios, since the process is symmetric for all miners.
3. Attacking node: The attacking node can send attack traffic to any miner. This node can be
either a malicious miner or an external node.
4. Hping3: is the tool we used to generate attack traffic. It is widely used for testing. It is
versatile and robust.
5. Wireshark: is the network analyzer we use.

3.2

The Experiment Design

We configure seven Ubuntu 18.04.2 virtual machines (VMs) on seven distinct physical host
machines in our Network Security Lab. The specifications of each are provided in Table 1.
Table I : Machine specifications

Memory

2 Gb

Storage (Hard Disk)

10 Gb

Number of CPUs

1

We configure five VMs as miners and one as a client. The client submits one xml file every
3 seconds to all participating miners. One of the five miners is assumed to be malicious. The
malicious miner VM sends attack traffic using hping3 to one of the honest miners. A new miner
attempts to join the network using IP address of any of the existing miners. and requests a
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blockchain update. One miner is randomly selected to send the blockchain update. Wireshark
captures traffic on the victim miner. The blockchain update is required to know the list of all the
participating miners; and the length of blockchain produced so far. Unless the new miner has the
blockchain produced so far, it can’t produce the new block and broadcast to the rest of the miners
if it gets selected by the LWM algorithm to add the new block. This is a very important step in the
implementation and is strenuous in terms of computation. Therefore, if our network performs with
an acceptable level of robustness in this step, we assume it can handle all other steps. We use the
time taken by the new node to have its request processed to measure Scrybe’s resilience and
robustness. The IP addresses of the nodes are in Table II.

Device

Table II :IP Addresses Used
Virtual Machine
IP Address

Personal Computer 1

Scrybe 1

192.168.10.108

Personal Computer 2

Scrybe 2

192.168.10.112

Personal Computer 3

Scrybe 3

192.168.10.150

Personal Computer 4

Scrybe 4

192.168.10.134

Personal Computer 5

Scrybe 5

192.168.10.138

Personal Computer 6

Scrybe 6

192.168.10.136

Personal Computer 7

Scrybe 7

192.168.10.110

We evaluate system performance for the attacks below. SYN cookies are enabled for
each mining node throughout our experiments. When a malicious miner launches the attack, care
is taken to maintain a ratio of less than

1
3

* N malicious miners to honest miners. N is the total

number of miners. For our evaluation, we use N = 5.
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3.2.1

Syn Flood With Ip Spoofing:

SYN flood attacks exploit the TCP three-way handshake. The target is to have as many half-open
TCP connections as possible and slow down the victim. In a normal TCP connection, a client sends
a SYN request. The server responds with a SYN-ACK acknowledgment packet. After receiving
the SYN-ACK from the server, the client responds with an ACK packet[12]. Then the connection
is established and data is exchanged. However, to establish an attack, the attacker sends an
enormous number of SYN requests to the server. The server can’t differentiate between the SYN
request of a malicious node and a legitimate SYN request. Therefore, it attempts to send a SYNACK in response to incoming SYN requests. However, the TCP queue of the server fills due to the
large flood of SYN packets rendering it unable to handle more incoming requests for a TCP
connection until the queue is reaped out. Any service requested from the server during this time
experiences a denial-of-service.
IP Spoofing uses a forged IP address as the source IP of an IP packet. The node sending the
packet fools the host with the target IP address into sending its reply packet to the node with the
forged address. This helps attackers escape detection.
This can be illustrated by:
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Figure 3.1(a). Normal traffic network

Figure 3.1(b). Network traffic with spoofed IP address
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In Figure 3.1(a), the network traffic operates normally. Host A sends traffic using its own IP address
and destination Host B replies to Host A. In Figure 3.1(b), Host A forges the IP address from Host
C while sending traffic to Host B. Consequently, Host B sends replies to Host C.
This is exploited by attackers by using the IP address of the target (victim) as the source address
while sending traffic requests to an enormous number of machines and directing the reply packets
to the target. Consequently, the target experiences resource throttling and authorized users of the
applications hosted on Host C experience a denial or delay of service.

3.2.1.1

Why Ip Spoofing Works:

IP routing follows a hop by hop mechanism. Each packet is routed separately, and the route
of each packet is decided by the routers the packets passes through. The reason why IP spoofing is
possible is because routers only use the destination IP address in the packet header to make routing
decisions. This means whether or not the source IP is valid, the packet delivery won’t be affected.
The destination only uses that address to reply to the source [28].
IP Spoofing can be accomplished primarily in the following two ways :

A.

With Spoofed Host Reachable

For evaluating the performance of Scrybe under the influence of this attack, we configure
the VMs as follows:
Table III: Nodes and their role for IP spoofing with spoofed host reachable

IP Address

Role

192.168.10.150

Miner (victim)

192.168.10.134

Miner (spoofed)

192.168.10.110

Miner

192.168.10.108

Miner

192.168.10.136

New Miner requesting update

192.168.10.138

Client

192.168.10.112

Malicious miner [Attacking node]
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Implementation:

We first use hping3 on the attacking node to see if the port we want to attack on is listening or
not.
The command used is: hping3 -V -p 10987 -S -c 1 192.168.10.150 ; where V means verbose
mode, 10987 is the port where our miners communicate with other nodes for our blockchain
network and hence is our target port, S means we are sending SYN traffic[9], c 1 means we stop
after sending one packet and receiving its reply packet of 1 and 192.168.10.150 is our target
machine.
After receiving a SYN-ACK packet in return, we confirm that the port is open and we can
successfully send attack traffic to it. Next, while the initial miners are mining and the client is
submitting files, we launch attack on the target miner using hping3 on the attacking node. To
demonstrate detection-evasion and attempt to malign an honest participating miner, we spoofed the
IP address of the latter while launching the attack. The new miner asks for a blockchain update
while the attack is ongoing.
The command used for the attack is: hping3 -V -p 10987 -S -d 120 –flood 192.168.10.150 -a
192.168.10.134; where flood continuously sends packets as quickly as possible without showing
replies , -a is used to spoof IP addresses while attacking, which, in our case is 192.168.10.134and
-d lets us set the data packet size in bytes, which in our case is 120.
Another relevant parameter relevant is TCP window size. We use the default value of 64 in
hping3 through out our experiments. Therefore, we don’t need to configure that explicitly in the
script. Since we are configuring the attack in flood mode, we don’t configure the count c because
that would be overridden by the flood mode.
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A portion Wireshark trace from the experiment is in Figure 3.2. SYN requests and SYNACK responses are shown. No final ACK from the client complete the handshake. We used the
following command on Wireshark to filter this traffic:
tcp.flags.syn==1 && (tcp.flags.syn==0

Figure 3.2. A portion of attack traffic captured on the victim node during the attack using Wireshark for IP
spoofing with spoofed host reachable

A portion of the TCP stream of the attack packets is shown in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3: TCP streams of the attack packets for IP spoofing with spoofed host reachable

24

Observations:

From Figure 3.2, we see a large number of SYN packets being sent continuously to the
victim. The packets appear to have been sent from miner with IP address as 192.168.10.134,
however, those are actually launched by the malicious miner with IP address as 192.168.10.112.
The server sends back the SYN-ACK reply to each of the SYN requests from 192.168.10.134 since
it has no way to tell those from non-malicious packets. Since the machine with IP address
192.168.10.134 didn’t initiate any of those SYN connections, it responds with an RST packet in
return, thereby terminating the connection.
From Figure 3.3, we observe the TCP stream for one of the attack packet. Similar TCP
stream was observed for all the attack packets. It appears that the spoofed machine responded with
a RST packet to the SYN-ACK reply the target machine sent to it because it thought that was the
source IP address of the initial SYN packet.

B.

With Spoofed Host Unreachable
It is also possible that the attacking nodes spoof the IP of a machine which has been
powered off. This avoids the spoofed machine terminating the connection. The VMs are
configured as follows:
TABLE IV: Nodes and their role for IP spoofing with spoofed host unreachable

IP Address

Role

192.168.10.150

Miner (victim)

192.168.10.134

Spoofed [Switched off]

192.168.10.110

Miner

192.168.10.108

Miner

192.168.10.136

New Miner requesting update

192.168.10.138

Client

192.168.10.112

Malicious miner [Attacking node]
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Implementation:

The implementation of this case is similar to section A. The only difference is that the spoofed
IP belongs to a VM which has been turned off. While the initial miners are mining and the client is
submitting files, we launch attack on the target miner using hping3 on the attacking node. The new
miner asks for a blockchain update while the attack is ongoing.
The command used for the attack is : hping3 -V -p 10987 -S -d 120 - - flood 192.168.10.150
-a 192.168.10.134 ; where 192.168.10.150 is the victim miner and -a is used to spoof the IP of
other node while attacking, which, in our case is 192.168.10.134. VM with IP address
192.168.10.134 is switched off.
A portion of the captured traffic on Wireshark is shown in Figure 3.4. However, the TCP stream is
different, as shown in Figure 3.5.
tcp.flags.syn==1 && tcp.flags.ack==0

Figure 3.4. A portion of attack traffic captured on the victim node during the attack using Wireshark for IP
spoofing with spoofed host unreachable
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Figure 3.5. TCP streams of one of the attack packets for IP spoofing with spoofed host unreachable

Observations

From Figure 3.4, we observe that unlike in Figure 3.2, there is no RST packet sent back
from the spoofed IP machine because the IP belongs to a machine which is inactive(switched
off).There is a large number of incomplete TCP connections because the initiator of the SYN
handshake never sent the final ACK packet required to establish the connection. Instead of that,
there is a large inflow of new SYN requests from the same IP address.
Figure 3.5 has TCP stream of one of the attack packets to further establish that the TCP connection
is half-open and just using the resources of the victim. Each attack packet has similar TCP stream.

3.2.2

Syn Flood With Randomized Ip Spoofing

IP Spoofing with a single source IP spoofed is comparatively less strong to escape detection
and foiling. Using botnets is another way of launching DDoS attacks. Botnets are an internetconnected network of devices which are running one or more bots, where a bot is a malwareinfected compromised machine that can remotely be controlled by a cybercriminal. However,
cybercriminals wishing to launch DDoS attacks but also wanting to avoid using large botnets can
send flood traffic with randomized IP spoofing. This helps them to conceal their own identity as
well as makes blocking the attack more challenging as it appears to be originating from many
sources simultaneously[28].
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For evaluating the performance of Scrybe under the influence of this attack, we configure
the VMs as follows:
TABLE V: Nodes and their role for randomized IP Spoofing attack

IP Address

Role

192.168.10.136

Miner (victim)

192.168.10.134

Miner

192.168.10.110

Miner

192.168.10.108

Miner

192.168.10.150

New Miner requesting update

192.168.10.138

Client

192.168.10.112

Malicious miner [Attacking node]

Implementation:

The implementation of this case is similar to section A. The difference is that the attack traffic
comes from a large number of random IP addresses available on the internet for this. While the
initial miners are mining and the client is submitting files, we launch attack on the target miner
using hping3 on the attacking node keeping source node as random. The new miner asks for a
blockchain update while the attack is ongoing.
The command used is: hping3 -V -d 120 -S -p 10987 - -flood - - rand source 192.168.10.136
;where 192.168.10.136 is the victim miner and rand source is the mode of the sending the attack
traffic. In this mode, hping3 looks for random IP addresses available over the internet and makes
the attack seem to be launched from all those. This option stresses the firewall state tables and other
per-ip dynamic tables (which can be used to block traffic from a particular malicious IP address)
in the TCP/IP stack and the firewall software.
The captured traffic on Wireshark is shown in Figure 3.6; and the TCP stream is different, as shown
in Figure 3.7.
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As mentioned in previous sections, the Wireshark filter used to see the attack traffic is :
tcp.flags.syn==1 && tcp.flags.ack==0

Figure 3.6. A portion of traffic captured on the victim node during the attack using Wireshark for
Randomized IP spoofing

Figure 3.7. TCP stream of one of the attack packets for randomized IP spoofing
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Observations

From Figure 3.7, we observe that the SYN flood packets appear to be launched from a large
number of random IP addresses across the internet. The victim miner responds to each of the SYN
request with a SYN-ACK packet since it has no way to tell a legit SYN request from the malicious
one because these requests are not from a single IP as the source address.
From Figure 3.7, we observe the TCP stream of one of the attack packets. This is also an
incomplete SYN handshake resulting a half-opened TCP connection. All the attack packets have
similar TCP streams.

3.2.3

LAND DoS Attack

LAND attack is a DoS attack where the attacker crafts the attack packets in such a way that
the source IP address and the port and the destination IP address and the port of the TCP segments
is the same[16], i.e. that of the victim’s; and the port chosen is one of the open ports on the victim.
In a way, it’s a variant of IP spoofing where the spoofed IP address is same as the victim’s IP
address. This attack results in the victim ending up in a continuous loop (lock-up) of sending
packets and responses to itself until the system is crashed or the attack is detected [29,30].
Diagrammatically, LAND DoS attack can be represented as shown in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8 . LAND DoS attack illustration

For evaluating the performance of Scrybe under the influence of this attack, we configure the
VMs as follows:

TABLE V: Nodes and their roles for LAND attack

IP Address

Role

192.168.10.150

Miner (victim)

192.168.10.110

Miner

192.168.10.108

Miner

192.168.10.136

New Miner requesting update

192.168.10.138

Client

192.168.10.112

Malicious miner [Attacking node]
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Implementation:

The implementation of this attack makes it seem that a large number of packets are sent from
the victim continuously to itself on one of its ports. While the initial miners are mining and the
client is submitting files, we launch attack on the target miner using hping3 on the attacking node
keeping source node as random. The new miner asks for a blockchain update while the attack is
ongoing.
The command used is : sudo hping3 -V -d 120 -w 64 -S -p 10987 -k -s 10987 - -flood
192.168.10.150 -a 192.168.10.150 , where 192.168.10.150 is the victim node, -a is used to spoof
the source IP address to the victim’s IP address so that the machine keeps sending traffic
continuously to itself, -s is used to select a base source port to send the traffic to the destination
port, -k is used to keep this port number still, i.e. keep sending traffic from this port continuously.
By default, the source port is incremented by one with each new packet sent.
The captured traffic on Wireshark is shown in Figure 3.9; and the TCP stream is different, as shown
in Figure 3.10.
As mentioned in previous sections, the Wireshark filter used to see the attack traffic is :
tcp.flags.syn==1 && tcp.flags.ack==0
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Figure 3.9. A portion of the attack traffic captured on Wireshark for LAND attack

Figure 3.10. TCP stream of one of the attack packets for LAND attack

Observations:

From Figure 3.9, we observe a continuous traffic going from the same IP address to the same
destination address, with the same port as the source as the destination port. Since the SYN packet
flood is originating from the same source port, i.e. 10987, the Wireshark sees it as an unusual
behavior stating the ‘TCP Port numbers reused warning’.
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Figure 3.10 shows the TCP stream. There is only a SYN packet from source to destination. Due to
SYN packets circling around the same port and IP address for both source and destination, the
machine drops these and does not reply with a SYN-ACK packet instead.

3.3

Results

In each case of experiments, the mining algorithm runs successfully, and we have a selected miner
at the end of each round to produce the new block. The
The response times for each of the attack cases above is noted. For reference, we also checked how
much time does it take for the new miner to get the response when the network is not under
influence of any attack. The results are summarized in the following table.
TABLE VI- Mean Response times for different attack cases
Case

[values reported on a 95% confidence interval]
Mean No. of
attack
Mean Response time of the victim [seconds]
packets sent
When miner under
attack selected to send
response to the
blockchain request

No attack
SYN flood with IP spoofing

-

-

When another miner
selected to send
response to the
blockchain request

5

Spoofed IP
reachable

612195

24.2 ± 4.41

5

Spoofed IP
unreachable

1643336

32 ± 3.46

5

SYN Flood with Randomized
IP Spoofing

926612

25.4 ± 4.67

5

LAND Attack

1567141

30.9 ± 2.99

5
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Mean Response time [seconds]

40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
No Attack

IP Spoofing with spoofed machine reachable

IP Spoofing with spoofed machine unreachable

Randomized IP Spoofing

LAND attack

Figure 3.11. Graphical representation of mean response times in case of no attack and different subcases of
the SYN flood attack with 95% confidence interval

The time-series graphs for the case with no attack and the case with maximum impact on
the response time (SYN flood with an unreachable Spoofed IP) are provided in the
following figures.

Figure 3.12. Time-series graph for Scrybe mining rounds with no attack
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Figure 3.13. Time-series graph for Scrybe mining rounds with SYN Flood attack with unreachable spoofed
IP address

Observations:

From Table IV and Figure 3.11, we observe that the network performance statistics change
under the influence of an attack by a considerable extent. The attack with maximum impact is the
SYN flood using IP spoofing with Spoofed machine not reachable.

3.4

Effect Of Increasing The Size Of The Attack Packets On The Impact
Of DoS Attacks
We also study the effect of increasing the size of the attack packets on the impact of the

DoS attacks.
For this, we consider the attack case which resulted in the maximum impact, i.e. SYN
flooding using Spoofed IP with spoofed machine un-reachable. The size of attack packets is
determined using the d parameter in the hping3 command.
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The command used is: hping3 -V -p 10987 -S -d X –flood 192.168.10.150 -a 192.168.10.134
where X is the size of the packets. We tested the system for X = 120, 300, 600,900 and 1200 and
determined the response time when a new miner requests for a blockchain update.
The results of these tests are summarized in Table VIII.
Table VII: Effect of increasing size of attack packets
[Values reported with 95% confidence interval]
Size of the attack packets[bytes]

Mean Response Time of the victim [seconds]
When miner under attack
selected to send response to
the blockchain request

When another miner selected
to send the response to the
blockchain request

120

32 ± 3.46

5

300

33.4 ± 2.63

5

600

35 ± 1.93

5

900

38.44 ± 3.33

5

1200

43.33 ± 4.68

5

Mean response time [seconds]

60
50
120

40

300
30

600

20

900
1200

10
0

Size of the attack packets[bytes]
Figure 3.14. Graphical representation of effect of size of attack packets on the impact of the SYN flood
attacks
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CHAPTER 4
Analysis
From results in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we observe that the network performance statistics
change under the influence of an attack by a considerable extent. When the miner which gets
selected to send the response to the blockchain request is under the influence of an attack, the
response time increases. The reason for the increase of response time is the incomplete SYN
connections in the victim’s TCP queue as a result of a large number of SYN packets sent by the
attacker. On receiving the SYN packets, the victim responds with the SYN-ACK packet for each
of those; and keeps waiting for the final ACK packet from the node which initiated the SYN request.
Until the TCP queue is reaped from the incomplete connection entries, the victim’s resources get
throttled causing it to refuse new connection requests. As a result, it is not able to process the
request of a legitimate user while under the influence of an attack.
The attack with maximum impact is the SYN flood using IP spoofing with Spoofed
machine unreachable. Maximum number of the attack packets are sent in this case to the victim
until it again becomes responsive. The reason lies in the TCP parameter ‘syn-ack-retries’. The
victim is configured to keep retransmitting the SYN-ACK packet in response to the initial SYN
request for a certain number of times as configured on the kernel. Since the attacker used a spoofed
IP address, and kept that machine powered off, the victim has to spend an additional time in trying
to reach the machine first. In addition to not sending the ACK packet, the machine does not even
send an RST packet like in the case of reachable spoofed IP, since it is powered off. The server
keeps retrying to reach the spoofed IP by sending the SYN_ACK packet a number of times as
configured in the tcp_syn_ack_retries parameter[30]. In all of the attack cases with victim being the
selected miner to send the blockchain update response, the performance of the network is degraded.
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The effect of the size of the attack packets is summarized in Table VII and Figure 3.14. As
the size of the attack packets is increased, the attacks become more effective causing the response
time to increase. At a packet size of 1200 bytes, the response time becomes equal to that of the
worst-case scenario we achieved in Table VI, i.e. the SYN flood using IP spoofing with Spoofed
machine not-reachable. It should be noted that in each of the cases of packet-size, we have used a
value less than the Maximum Transmission Unit [MTU]. For our network [Ethernet], the MTU is
1500.
This raises an important question about the reliability of distributed systems. Even though
blockchains claim to ensure security and immutability, delay in the response of the network can
cause many harmful implications. The stakes are higher for critical applications such as e-banking,
healthcare and other important infrastructure.
However, an important observation is that when the miner which gets selected to send the response
to the blockchain request is not the victim of the DoS attack, the response time is same as when no
attack is launched. This means potentially, the attacker failed to launch a DoS attack on our network
in this case. This implies that the probability of users experiencing denial-of-service while using
our network is equal to the probability that the selected miner to send blockchain update responses
is the victim.
Mathematically,
P(successful DoS attack on Scrybe) = P(selected miner to send blockchain updates to be the victim)
Since miners are randomly selected, the probability of selection is uniformly distributed.
1

1

= > P(selected miner to send blockchain updates to be the victim) = 𝑁 = 5
Therefore, for our experiments
1

P(successful DoS attack on Scrybe) = 5
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As N increases, the probability of a successful DoS attack on Scrybe decreases for a constant
number of miners under attack simultaneously.

4.1

Role Of Syn-Cookies
An important point to lay emphasis on is the SYN flood attacks were successful despite

the SYN cookies being enabled. SYN cookies are generally considered useful against SYN flood
attacks because of their stateless nature. These are configured in the /etc/sysctl.conf file and take
integer values as arguments. A value of 1 means these are enabled and would be active in case a
SYN flood occurs and help the server to avoid dropping connections when the SYN queue gets
filled up. These are enabled by adding the following in the /etc/sysctl.conf file:
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
Conventionally, when a client sends a SYN packet, an entry is made in the TCP queue for
that regardless of the final ACK packet transmission. Enabling SYN cookies involves storing the
initial SYN entry in an encoded form into the sequence number sent in the SYN-ACK packet. If
the initial host responds back with a final ACK packet to complete the connection, it would use the
sequence number equal to the sequence number used in the SYN-ACK packet incremented by
1.Upon receiving the ACK packet, the server decodes the sequence number and is able to
reconstruct the SYN queue entry to proceed with the connection as in a conventional TCP protocol.
However, there are two major caveats to enabling SYN cookies. Server has a limit of only
8 unique MSS values since SYN cookies use 3 bits to encode that information in the SYN queue
entry. In addition, the server must reject all TCP options (such as large windows), because the SYN
queue entry where this information is otherwise stored is discarded by the server.
Another important implication of using SYN cookies is an additional computational
overhead. Implementing SYN cookies involves a cryptographic hash of the IP address and the port
number used on the server and the timestamp while sending the responses to the SYN requests.
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This results in an extensive overhead. When attacks occur and the SYN cookies are enabled, the
server has to spend a lot of efforts encrypting responses to the incoming SYN requests. This also
results in a slower response by the server to the requests from legitimate users.
SYN cookies are not capable of reducing or deflecting traffic. Therefore, SYN cookies are
not necessarily useful against attacks targeting bandwidth. The attacks launched on Scrybe involved
sending thousands of SYN packets per second, similar to a bandwidth attack.
We’ll try to optimize the utility of enabling SYN cookies to mitigate the impact of SYN floods
using the tcp_syn_ack_retries and the tcp_max_syn_backlog kernel parameters in the next chapter.

4.2

Optimization Of Kernel Parameters To Strengthen Defense Of Syn Cookies
Against DDoS Attacks
We tried to study the effect of changing the tcp_syn_ack_retries and the

tcp_max_syn_backlog parameters to help SYN cookies offer better protection against the SYN
flood attacks.Both of these kernel parameters are tunable. We choose a These parameters are also
configured in the /etc/sysctl.conf file.

•

tcp_syn_ack_retries :

This parameter determines the number of times the server should retry to send the SYN-ACK
packet in response before giving up waiting for the final ACK packet. On Linux machines, the
default is 5. We tested the system performance by lowering this value and checking the response
time while under the influence of D/DoS attack. The results are for the worst-case scenario we
achieved in Table VI, i.e. the SYN flood using IP spoofing with Spoofed machine not-reachable.
Table VIII provides the summary of the results.
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Table VIII: Effect of decreasing tcp_syn_ack_retries value
[Values reported at 95% confidence interval]

tcp_syn_ack_retries value

Response time[seconds]

5

32 ± 3.46

4

29.7 ± 3.62

3

28.33 ± 3.42

2

26.22 ± 3.66

1

22.55 ± 3.48

0

15.44 ± 2.05
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Mean response time [seconds]
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1
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tcp_syn_ack_retries value

Figure 4.1. Graphical representation of the effect of decreasing the tcp_syn_ack_retries parameter value
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Observations:

The performance of the system increases while being attacked if the number of syn_ack_retries
value is reduced. In other words, the server doesn’t wait for a longer time before terminating the
connection request. The retry times are calculated based on the Round Trip Time [RTT] between
the peers. For linux systems, it is around 2 seconds for the first packet, doubled to 4 seconds after
second retry packet sent, then 8 seconds for the next packet, and so on [31]. Configuring the server
to a zero number of syn_ack_retries improves the performance considerably during the SYN flood
attacks. However, there is a trade-off. The connections with legitimate nodes can suffer network
congestion or link failure momentarily and the SYN-ACK packet might not reach them. The server
should be able to attempt retransmitting the packet if need be. For that reason, we set this value to
an optimum value of 3.
Next, using the syn_ack_retry value of 3, we try to optimize the system performance changing the
tcp_max_syn_backlog parameter as follows:

•

tcp_max_syn_backlog:

This parameter determines when to activate the syn cookies. When the TCP connection requests
exceed the value set in this parameter, the system starts using the syn cookies. As discussed in
Section 5.1.1, enabling syn cookies (setting a value of 1) means those are enabled and can be
activated as required. On Linux machines, the default value is 128 (27).
We studied the effect of increasing the value of this parameter.
The results are summarized below:
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Table IV: Effect of increasing tcp_max_syn_backlog value
[values reported at 95% confidence interval]

tcp_max_syn_backlog value
tcp_syn_ack_retries =3

127
256
512
1024
2048

Mean response time
[seconds]
28.33 ± 3.42
23.77± 4.0
18.55 ± 2.74
17.33 ± 1.59
11.55 ± 1.29

Mean response time[seconds]

35
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15
10
5
0
127

256

512

1024

2048

tcp_max_syn_backlog value
Figure 4.2. Graphical representation of the effect of decreasing value of the tcp_syn_backlog

Observations:

The performance of the system improves with the increasing number of the
tcp_max_syn_backlog value. This is because an increased value must mean the TCP queue
saturates at a higher number of flood packets in case of a SYN flood attack, thereby, responding
faster to the legitimate connections. In addition to this, a higher value means that the syn cookies
are not activated until the TCP connection requests exceed 2048. As discussed earlier, syn cookies
increase computational overhead and slow the performance during the flooding attacks collaterally.
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We observe that the response time goes down to 11 seconds for the tcp_max_syn_backlog value of
2048 as compared to 31 seconds on the default value of 127.
Like in the case of tcp_syn_ack_retries parameter, arbitrarily increasing the value of this
parameter is not a reasonable idea. Each entry in SYN queue takes 256 bytes and in case a SYN
flood is launched, all those resources would be wasted on storing the attack packets. Therefore, it
is not a good idea to configure the max_syn_backlog to a very large value.
The overall improvement as a result of optimizing both the tcp_max_syn_backlog value
and the max_syn_ack_retries value can be seen by comparing the mean response time of about 32
seconds before optimization to about 11 seconds after optimization.
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CHAPTER 5
Lightweight Mining Consensus

As described in Chapter 1, Malicious miners and arbitrary faults might disrupt the
functioning of the blockchain network using multiple strategies. They might share conflicting hash
values or secret values to different miners causing confusion and try to favor a certain outcome of
the modulo-n addition operation. They might also exclude certain client files, or files from certain
clients, thereby, denying them the service they have employed the blockchain technology for
However, as long as there is at least a single honest miner in the network, faults can’t disrupt the
network. In a practical blockchain network, there would always be more than one honest miner. In
this work, we showed a single honest miner is enough to keep a check on faulty activities in a
blockchain network. As number of honest miners increases, so does their control of the consensus
in a blockchain network.
In this chapter, we verify that as long as there is at least one host miner in the network,
consensus is reached, and the client transactions are registered on the blockchain. The detailed
algorithm is provided first. Then we prove theorems and discuss cases which prove our hypothesis
that a single honest miner is sufficient to keep a check on the faulty activities in a blockchain
network.
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Lightweight Mining (LWM)
Lightweight Mining Algorithm (LWM)
Input: The number of miners N.
Algorithm: For each miner mi, 0 ≤ i ≤ N-1,
• Step 1: mi generates a secret value (random number) si ;
• Step 2: mi broadcasts the SHA-3 hash of the si, denoted by H(si) after signing it with its
private key Pi.
• Step 3(a): Wait for 𝑛3 hashes and proceed to Step 3(b).
• Step 3(b): Broadcast the 𝑛3 hashes received in Step 3(a) to all the miners. Once values received from
50% + 1 number of miners, check that no conflicting values have been received corresponding to a
particular miner. If yes, drop those values and evict those miner(s) from the current round. Once
verification done, proceed.

•
•
•

Step 4: mi broadcasts the secret value si signed with its private key Pi.
Step 5(a): Wait for 𝑛3 random numbers and proceed to Step 5(b).
Step 5(b): Broadcast the 𝑛3 secret values received in Step 5(a) to all the miners. Once values received
from 50% + 1 number of miners, check the following:
o No conflicting values have been received corresponding to a particular miner.
o Verify that the secret value corresponds to the hash shared in Step 3(a).
If discrepancies found in any of these two checks, drop those values and evict the miner(s) involved from
the current round.
Once check completed, proceed to the modulo-addition operation.

•

Step 6: mi calculates l = ∑𝑁−1
𝑗=0 𝑠j mod N
C is the consensus on the selected miner, l, to create the new block from the collected
client files. (Without loss of generality, we map mi = j, 0 ≤ j ≤ N-1 as a simple rank
ordering for the registered miners.)

5.1

Overview

In this paper, we focus on verifying the robustness of our blockchain i.e. the ability of nodes to
converge to a decision despite the presence of arbitrary errors. This is most easily modeled, by
allowing the presence of malicious nodes which we could try to disrupt the functioning of the
algorithm. Lamport's work explains that other failure models are overly optimistic[28].
To guarantee that Scrybe reaches consensus, we rely on Lamport’s Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(BFT) results. BFT work proves [38] that it is impossible to reach consensus if the number of faulty
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1

nodes, f, in a distributed network is not less than 3rd of the total nodes, n. Though BFT handles the
final outcome to be either ‘0’ or ‘1’, we and we try to reach a consensus on a value 0 to n-1, where
we need to show both consensus and that the value is an emergent property of the set of nodes such
that no group of nodes can influence the choice as long as any single node does not collude with that
group. BFT needs

1rd
3

of n to have the same value, S. We need responses from

1rd
3

of n, regardless of the

values.
1
3

We accept Lamport's result that the number of malicious nodes must be less than * n. This
may not be the largest number of malicious nodes we can tolerate, that proof is outside the scope
of this paper. Using a larger number would slow down our algorithm. Using a smaller number may
be unrealistic. We accept the

𝑛
3

value as one that is widely used in this domain and practical for our

system. Given Lamport's result, we limit the size of the colluding set to less than
participating nodes, and therefore waiting for

1rd
3

1rd
3

of the

of the n possible values ensures that at least

one value is from an honest miner.

5.2

Reaching Consensus In Scrybe
In Scrybe's lightweight mining process, there are three main phases where information is

shared: the hash-sharing phase, the secret-sharing phase, and the block-sharing phase:
1. Hash-sharing phase: Each miner, mi, generates a random number, called a secret-value, si,.,
computes its hash H(si), signs H(si) using its private key , Pi , and shares the signed hash with
all other participating miners.
1

a.

Once 3rd of the n number of hashes is received on a node, we proceed to Step b.

b.

In this step, all the miners broadcast all the

𝑛
3

hashes they received in Step a. This

ensures that all the miners agree on a set of values.
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Once values from 50 % + 1 number of the miners are received, thereby, ensuring the network has
not fractured, we verify the following:
•

No conflicting values have been received corresponding to a particular miner. If yes,
drop those values, identifying the miner(S) with their private key(s), and evict them
from the current round.

Once verification done, proceed to Step 2.
2. Secret-sharing phase: In this phase, each miner is expected to share its secret value si ,
signed with its private key,Pi, with all the miners.
1rd

a.

Once

b.

In this step, all the miners broadcast the

3

of n secret values are received, we proceed to Step b.
𝑛
3

secret values they received in Step a.

This ensures that all the miners have the common majority of values required to run the modulo-n
operation. Once values from 50 % + 1 of the miners are received, thereby, ensuring that the network
has not fractured, we check the following:
•

No conflicting values have been received corresponding to a particular miner.

•

Verify that the secret value corresponds to the hash shared in Step 3(a).

Once check is completed, the modulo-n operation is implemented on each node to select the miner
to create the new block.
3. Block-sharing phase: Once consensus is reached on which miner would create the new
block Bi, the selected miner broadcasts the new block, signed with its private key with all the
miners who participated in Step 2. After all the miners verify the validity of the block, they
append it to their own copies of the blockchain.
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5.3

Cases

I.

An honest miner gets selected to create the new block: This is an ideal situation as
an honest miner would ensure all the client transactions since last block are included in the
current block. Thus, clients are provided the services they have employed the blockchain
for. After creating the block, the honest miner signs in and broadcast it to the rest of the
miners who verify it and add it to their own copy of blockchain.

II.

A malicious miner gets selected to create the new block: The modulo-n addition
can result in a malicious miner to get selected to create the new block. A malicious miner
can choose to exclude transactions submitted from a specific client or clients, thereby
denying them the services they are authorized for. However, when the new block is created,
the selected miner needs to sign it with its key and broadcast it. If any transaction has been
left out, the honest miner(s) would be able to detect it upon verification even if the other
malicious miners form a coalition with the selected malicious miner. Hence, due to failing
to prove the validity, the block would be deleted. Since the invalid block was signed by the
malicious miner, we know who the miner was and evict them from the current mining
round.

Theorem : Given a set of n nodes, each with a secret value S(j), where at most

𝑛
3

are faulty, the

non-faulty nodes can reach consensus C on a value l, where l is the miner selected to create the new
block, and = ∑𝑁−1
𝑗=0 𝑠j mod N.
Proof: We begin by proving that as long as there is at least one honest miner in the network, the
selection of the miner to create the next block is random and can’t be controlled by the malicious
miners. To prove this, we show if values from n -1 miners result in a particular output of the
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modulo-n operation, an honest miner can choose the secret value in a way which forces the
summation to whatever we want. In practice, the miners bind to a value and the sum can’t be forced
to a desired value at any cost. But this proof describes that having at least a single value from an
honest miner randomizes the output and makes it fair.
Without loss of generality, let us assign the honest miner mn an index 0. Hence, the non-malicious
nodes are in the range 0 < j < N. All the nodes Nj share hash values H(si) and secret values sj for 0
< j < N. Let us assign l = ∑𝑁−2
𝑗=0 𝑠j mod(N-1) as the modulo-n operation result of the values chosen
by the malicious miners. If an honest miner picks an arbitrary integer value k from the range 0 to
N-1, we can assign the secret value for the honest miner as s0= ( l– k)mod N that forces the
summation in the modulo-n operation to be whatever we want.
Thus, the result is not controlled by the malicious miners anymore because the honest miner would have to
agree with the values generated on the malicious nodes.

Axiom: As long as there is at least a single honest miner in the network generating a random
number from range 0 – n-1 with uniform distribution, all the results are equally likely.

Theorem: We can always detect if a malicious miner sends conflicting values to different miners
Proof: The value can be received and promulgated by either a single node or multiple nodes. Step
1

1.b of the LWM involves broadcasting the 3 * n hashes received in Step 3.a to all the miners. If
only one node gets the value, then all nodes get that value, so there is no conflict. Another scenario
could be that multiple miners receive the same value which also results in no conflict. However, if
conflicting values are sent out to different miners, the broadcast step allows nodes to drop those
values.
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Once values from 50% + 1 miners are received, we proceed to next phase. This means, the hashes
sent out by the malicious miners would be received at each node from multiple sources. Comparing
the hashes corresponding to each miner, an honest miner would confirm if conflicting values have
been sent out. Since all the hashes need to be signed, we can determine the miner(s) who sent out
conflicting values and evict them from the network for the current round. The algorithm proceeds
with the remaining validated values.
Similarly, a malicious miner can’t go undetected if they send conflicting random numbers (secret
values) to different miners.
Mathematically, if a miner mi sends a hash H(si) to one miner, the hash value corresponding to mi
as H(si) after the broadcast step of 3.b. should be same for all the miners.
H(si) = H(sj) iff i = j
As long as there is at least one honest miner, this condition is satisfied.

Theorem: We can always detect if a malicious miner sends a secret value which doesn’t correspond
to the hash shared in the hash-sharing phase

Proof: Step 2.a requires miners to send the hashes first before sending the actual secret value. Both
the hashes and secret values are signed by the miner’s private key. If a malicious miner sends a
secret value which does not correspond to the hash they sent previously, an honest miner would
confirm this activity upon comparison of the hash generated by the secret value shared by the miner
with the hash the miner shared themselves previously. The signature would determine which miner
did it and they are evicted from the network for the current round. The algorithm proceeds with the
validated values.
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Mathematically, if a miner mi sends out a secret number si in the secret-sharing phase, hash of the
number, i.e. H(si) should be equal to the hash the miner mi shared in the hash-sharing phase. This
is guaranteed as long as there is at least one honest miner in the network.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
This thesis focuses on the security analysis of a blockchain network, Scrybe, evaluating its
robustness and availability. To do this, common approaches are considered for disabling, or
degrading distributed systems. The most successful tools are generally referred to as Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. To verify our proposed blockchain network, we therefore
integrate successful DDoS methods into our verification suite. Since Scrybe uses TCP for
communication, we leverage DoS attacks as a tool to exploit the known flaws in the TCP such as
the SYN flood D/DoS attack.
We observe that the presence of D/DoS attacks increases the response time of the network.
We also observe how the performance changes with change in some Linux kernel TCP parameters.
Consensus is reached in all the cases.
We also consider the possibility of a malicious miner(s) attempting to disrupt the
functioning of the blockchain network so that client files are not successfully registered on the
network. We verified that as long as there is at least a single honest miner in the network, consensus
on who gets to create the new block is guaranteed and the client files are registered on the network.

6.1

Future Work

The experiments and results are valid for our test case scenario of one malicious miner out
of five malicious miners. As the total number of participating miners increases, and more malicious
miners are present, the impact of the attacks could be more powerful because they could be
launched by proper coordination of the malicious miners. They could attack multiple miners
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simultaneously, thereby, increasing the probability of the miner getting selected to send the
blockchain update response to be under the influence of the attack. As a result, the probability of
legitimate miners or clients experiencing denial-of-service can be increased.
We verified how consensus is reached as long as there is at least one honest miner in the
1

network. In practice we would have an n number of miners with less than 3 * n faulty. We need to
verify the minimum number of n for which our tests and proofs are valid.
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